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Determinants of Inter-Governmental Cooperation in the Greater Jakarta Area, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This research was determined to analyze the collaboration concept execution between the regional governments in the Jabodetabekjur regions, Indonesia. The research consists of four variables; (1). starting conditions; (2). facilitative leadership; (3). institutional design; and (4). collaborative process. Structural Equation Model (SEM) with SmartPLS is being used to analyze the data. The 87 respondents' information was collected from various government institutions within the Jabodetabekjur regions. The results show that the collaboration amongst the government institutions in the Jabodetabekjur regions was not effectively executed, due to the imbalance of resources in the starting condition phase. It is shown that the DKI Jakarta (Special Capital Region of Jakarta) has more dominant financial resources than other regions.

Keywords: *Collaborative, Government, Jabodetabekjur*

INTRODUCTION

The areas of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi, and Cianjur (Jabodetabekjur) are megapolitan areas that have functional relationships and form a system in order to handle the dynamics and content of the highest issues and activities in Indonesia. The megapolitan area has a population of around 33,300,000 (BPS Jakarta, West Java and Banten, 2020) covering adjoining/bordering districts/cities covered in 3 (three) provinces, namely DKI Jakarta Province, West Java Province, and Banten Province. The district/city area consists of 9 (nine) district/city government areas, namely Bogor Regency, Bogor City, Depok City, Tangerang Regency, Tangerang City, South Tangerang City, Bekasi Regency, Bekasi City and Cianjur Regency.

The large number of occupations not only contributes positively to the national economy, which is indicated by 20% Gross Demestic Product (GDP), very high dynamics of development and high economic turnover. However, it also has negative implications with the emergence of various problems such as changes in land use from catchment areas/protected areas to residential/industrial areas, reduced rice fields, population mobility between Jakarta - Bodetabekjur which is very high ± 4.06 million/day which results in traffic jams, flooding, decreasing quality and quantity of water resources and other environmental damage.

The problems in the Jabodetabekjur area are interrelated and interdependent with each other. Where the solution requires more optimal and integrated coordination and cooperation, especially with the current era of autonomy, where districts/cities have real broad autonomy and are responsible for their local people.

Therefore, cooperation in the Jabodetabekjur Region is a must, because the DKI Jakarta Provincial government and the Bodetabekjur regional government can no longer solve problems on their own without cooperation. The development and effects of the development of DKI Jakarta and

Bodetabekjur which influence each other require that the planning of the Jabodetabekjur area must be viewed as an integral ecosystem (functional urban region) that cannot be separated.

The impact of increasing urbanization is changing the pattern of open land space into built up land. Changes in the spatial structure will have an impact on increasing demand for needs, including road infrastructure for smooth traffic, as well as urban drainage that is able to serve the needs of the community and is free from the impact of environmental changes such as flooding, due to land use being faster than planned. In planning with a spatial or regional approach, there are various ways to determine regional units, namely the eco-region concept based on ecosystems.

Therefore, one or more government policies in areas that are part of the eco-region are needed in an integrated manner to overcome all the problems that occur. This is because inter-regional inter-regional problems cannot be handled by the autonomous regional city government alone. Based on these conditions, the research problem will focus on analyzing the concept of implementing cooperation between local governments in the Jabodetabekjur area with a collaborative governance approach (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Collaborative governance is a process and structure in the management and formulation of public policy decisions that involve constructive actors from various levels, both at the government level and/or public agencies, private institutions, and civil society in order to achieve public goals that cannot be achieved. when carried out by only one party.

More fully (Ansell & Gash, 2008) defines collaborative governance as "A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets".

This definition emphasizes six important criteria: (1) forums are initiated by public institutions or agencies, (2) participants in forums include non-state actors, (3) participants are directly involved in decision-making and are not simply "consulted" by public bodies, (4) forum parties are formally organized and meet collectively, (5) the forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not reached in practice), and (6) the focus of the collaboration is on public policy or public management.

According to (Ansell & Gash, 2008) in the collaborative governance model (figure 2.1) there are several prerequisites or main variables as processes and important points, namely (1). starting conditions; (2). facilitative leadership; (3). institutional design; and (4). collaborative processes.

The starting conditions or the initial conditions for the parties to collaborate collaboratively is a process to analyze whether there is an asymmetric power-resources-knowledge or a very high gap in power and strength, resources or knowledge between the various parties who will collaborate. This includes whether there is a past history, either in a context that supports or hinders collaboration. This is because if there is a gap that is too wide, the starting conditions for the collaboration process will not run optimally. Some views and opinions from (Ansell & Gash, 2008) regarding the Starting Condition variable are:

1. If there are differences and/or imbalances in resources and capacities between stakeholders, so that collaborative governance can be effectively carried out, what is needed is a shared commitment to empowerment (empowerment) of stakeholders who have weak capacities and resources;
2. Regarding the participation factor of the collaborating parties, if there are other alternatives that allow stakeholders to achieve their goals unilaterally, then collaborative governance will function if there is an understanding from stakeholders that they are mutually dependent on one another together;
3. Regarding incentives for stakeholders who depend on each other in an exclusive collaborative forum, parties outside the forum are needed, namely, among others, the judiciary, legislators and higher-ranking government, to ensure stakeholders respect and comply with the results of the collaboration process, and;

4. If there is a past history and antagonism between stakeholders prior to collaborative governance, the collaboration process will not be successful, unless a) there is a high degree of interdependence among stakeholders, or b). Steps are taken to restore the level of trust and social cohesion among stakeholders.

Figure 1. A Model of Collaborative Governance
Source: Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practices, Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, University of California-Barkeley : 2008

The next variable from the Collaborative Governance model (Ansell & Gash, 2018) is the presence of facilitative leadership, providing mediation and democracy are also needed in the collaboration process, so that in the end the collaboration process and the expected results can also be achieved. Facilitation is an effort that does not interfere with the prerogative of stakeholder management, the role of the facilitator is to ensure the integrity of the consensus building process itself. Meanwhile, mediation is carried out in order to increase the role of third party intervention in the details of the substance of the negotiation, when the stakeholders are not effective in exploring the possible benefits for all parties (win-win solution). If the stakeholders cannot reach a consensus with the help of mediation, then a third party can come up with a solution (non-binding arbitration).

(Vangen & Huxham, 2003) argue that for successful collaboration, leaders must often intervene in a more targeted way to shape the agenda. It further said that leadership is important to embrace, empower and engage stakeholders and then mobilize them to promote collaboration. Leadership is critical to establishing and maintaining clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, and exploring mutual benefits. Leadership is also important for empowering and representing weaker stakeholders. The facilitative leadership style also helps stakeholders to explore various possibilities for mutual benefit. Some views and opinions from (Ansell & Gash, 2008) regarding Facilitative Leadership variables are:

1. If in collaboration there is high conflict and low trust, but the distribution of power is relatively equal, stakeholders have incentives/willingness to participate, then collaborative governance can succeed by relying on intermediaries (facilitative leaders) who are honest and trusted by each stakeholder. The intermediary must also be a professional mediator;
2. In contrast to condition no (5) above, if the distribution of power is not balanced and the level of participation of each stakeholder is low, then the success of collaborative governance is determined by 'organic leaders' or leaders who emerge from within the stakeholder community.

The next main variable of the Collaborative Governance model (Ansell & Gash, 2008) is the institutional design of collaborative cooperation. Institutional design refers to the basic rules for collaboration, which is very important is related to the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process. Access to collaborative processes is itself a fundamental design problem. Some literature on collaborative governance emphasizes that the process must be open and inclusive. (Chrislip & Larson, 1994) state that the first condition for successful collaboration is that the institution of collaboration must include all stakeholders who are affected or concerned with this issue at large, including potentially "distressing" stakeholders. While the core of the process of legitimizing collaborative institutions, is seen based on (1) opportunities for stakeholders to negotiate with others about policy outcomes and (2) claims that policy outcomes represent a collective consensus and for the wider interest. (Ansell & Gash, 2008) stated that the success of collaborative agency design is influenced by:

1. There is inclusive participation of stakeholders;
2. The absence of an exclusive forum outside the collaborative institutions that have been formed, as a result of distrust or the emergence of alternative choices in achieving goals by each stakeholder or the form of skepticism from stakeholders;
3. There are clear ground rules;
4. (10) The occurrence of a collaborative collaborative process that is transparent, and not a cover for the particular interests of one or several stakeholders, and;
5. Deadlines for collaborative implementation, which allow the process of stakeholder discussion and dialogue to be carried out sufficiently to reach consensus, but not too long to create boredom

The next and core variable of collaborative governance is related to the collaborative process itself. (Ansell & Gash, 2008) see that the collaboration process is a 'cycle' and not a linear stage. Furthermore, the strategy in the collaboration process will also change when the context changes. However, the model from Ansell and Gash explains that although the collaboration process is cyclical and non-linear, it still begins with communication. Therefore, the important collaboration process is to start a face-to-face dialogue so that mutual trust and understanding is built with all stakeholders. And when mutual trust has grown, then what needs to be considered is the commitment in the collaboration process and influencing mutual understanding of each other in the form of determining a 'shared mission', which will produce a joint product as intermediate outcomes, before the results are obtained. the end (outcomes) as a common goal (common purpose). Regarding the dialogue process and building trust, Ansell and Gash argue that If past conditions have a history of conflict and antagonistic/skeptic attitudes from stakeholders, then policy makers or stakeholders must allocate time to build trust effectively. And if you don't devote time and money to the trust-building process, then collaborative processes and strategies.

Regarding the commitment to the collaboration process, Ansell and Gash argue that the buy-in management approach or the process of bargaining/lobbying/mutually influencing the interests of each stakeholder, is an important aspect to consider in the collaboration process and because it is still possible for other sides to be involved. the negative side of the collaboration process, namely the existence of manipulative and co-optation actions, then the collaborative governance strategy is more suitable for situations of sustainable forms of cooperation;

The building of a shared commitment from stakeholders in the collaborative process will lead to the so-called 'shared mission / commonality / common goals / shared vision / shared ideology / clear goals / clear and strategic direction / alignment of core values', as a shared understanding.

From all non-linear stages and cycles, what is no less important according to Ansell and Gash is the intermediate outcomes as a 'small success' which becomes the momentum and feedback for the successful implementation of Collaborative Governance (Ansell & Gash, 2018; Rogers & Weber , 2010; Vangen, Hayes, & Cornforth, 2015; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). This intermediate or 'small' success will encourage the building of each stakeholder's sense of trust and commitment. Hence Ansell and Gash stated that If in the past there has been a history of high 'skepticism' and antagonism, and long-term commitment is required then intermediate or 'small' successes are

critical. And if stakeholders or policy makers do not anticipate or ignore the need to determine the intermediate success of the implementation of cooperation, then the collaboration process is not possible.

METHODS

This research is a quantitative research. This study attempts to explain the variables involved in collaborative governance in Jabodetabekjur, Indonesia. Referring to (Ansell & Gash, 2008), the variables involved in this study include starting conditions, facilitative leadership, institutional design and collaborative process. These variables are reduced to dimensions and indicators so that the research instrument is formed.

Questionnaires were sent to government agencies in the Jabodetabekjur area. Government agencies involved in inter-regional cooperation and public services are included as respondents, namely the regional secretary, the Public Works and Spatial Planning Office (DPUPR), the Regional Planning and Development Agency (Bappeda), government bureaus, the Environment Agency (DLH), the Education Office, Cooperation Section, and the Department of Transportation. Referring to (Chuan, 2006), the number of research samples obtained is 84 respondents. The sample was taken from representatives of the agency.

The analysis used is a confirmatory analysis using a structural equation model (Structural Equation Modeling – SEM) with smartPLS. Partial Least Squares (PLS) can be used to test the data obtained by 87 respondents (Chin, 1998). Data were analyzed with SmartPLS 2.0 which was developed by (Ringle & Wende, S. Will, 2005). SmartPLS 2.0 was used with the consideration that SmartPLS 2.0 was developed based on the modeling and bootstrapping path, and was recommended by (Tenenhaus & Esposito, 2005) and (Wetzels, Odekerken-Schroder, & van Oppen, 2009). The research model developed is a reflective model. The purpose of the reflective model is data analysis, where further researchers can confirm the results of the analysis based on the theory that has been built and the questionnaire data that has been obtained (Ringle & Wende, S. Will, 2005).

RESULTS

This study uses the Structural Equation Model (SEM) with Partial Least Square (PLS) analysis technique. SEM analysis with PLS is carried out in three stages, namely outer model analysis, inner model analysis, and hypothesis testing.

Outer Model Analysis

The following table presents an analysis of the outer research model.

Table 1. Cronbach Alpha, Composite Reliability Dan Average Variance Extracted

Variabel	Cronbach's Alpha	Rho_A	Reabilitas Composite	AVE	Hasil
Starting Condition	0,646	0,732	0,776	0,591	All aspects of outer collaborative governance meet the standard
Facilitative Leadership	0,623	0,788	0,745	0,556	
Institutional Design	0,696	0,791	0,704	0,523	
Collaborative Process	0,923	0,935	0,942	0,731	

According to (Ghozali, 2014) the construct reliability test is measured by composite reliability and Cronbach's alpha. A construct is declared reliable if it has a composite reliability value above 0.70 and Cronbach's alpha above 0.60. While the average variance extracted (AVE) value that is adequate to measure validity is 0.5.

Based on the criteria in table 2, the output of the data processing shows the results of all the outer model criteria being met so it can be concluded that the research data has good validity and reliability, therefore it can be continued to the inner model analysis.

Inner model analysis/model structural analysis is carried out to ensure that the structural model built is robust and accurate. Robust regression is a regression method that is used when the

data has an abnormal distribution of errors or there are several outliers that affect the model (Ghozali, 2014). This method is an important tool for analyzing data that is affected by outliers so as to produce a model that is resistant to outliers. A resistant estimate is one that is not affected by large changes in a small part of the data or small changes in a large part of the data.

The evaluation of the inner model can be seen from several indicators which include; coefficient of determination (R^2); Predictive Relevance (Q^2); Goodness of Fit Index (GoF). The following is a calculation for each indicator.

Tabel 3. Nilai R^2

	R Square	R Square Adjusted
Collaborative Process	0,716	0,693

According to (Chin, 1998), the value of R square above 0.67 is strong, between 0.67 to 0.18 moderate, and below 0.19 is weak. So, the relationship between the variables involved in this study is categorized as having a strong relationship.

Predictive Relevance (Q^2) test was conducted to determine the predictive capability using the blindfolding procedure. According to (Chin, 1998), if the value obtained is between 0.02 and 0.15, the model has a small predictive ability. If the value obtained is between 0.15 to 0.35, the model has moderate predictive ability. Finally, if the value obtained is above 0.35, the model has a high predictive ability. Calculation of the value of Q^2 obtained a result of 0.99 then the model has a large predictive capability.

(Tenenhaus & Esposito, 2005) formulated that the GoF value was small when it was 0.1, moderate when it was 0.25, and large when it was 0.38. This study calculates the GoF value and finds that the model has a large GoF value. This means that the model can represent real phenomena. The GoF value in SEM with PLS is calculated manually (Tenenhaus (2004) with the formula;

$$GoF= \sqrt{\overline{AVE^2} \times \overline{R^2}}$$

GoF= 0.51

This study concludes that the calculation of the GoF value is 0.51. Therefore, it is concluded that the research model can capture the real phenomenon of government collaboration in Jabodetabekjur.

Hypothesis test

The structural model in SEM-PLS is done by bootstrapping process which produces a t-statistics value. If the t-statistic value is greater than the t-table with a 95% confidence level (>1.96), the effect is significant. Meanwhile, to find out how much influence between variables, then find out the value of the loading factor of the original sample (O) output. This can be seen in the path coefficient table at the smartPLS output. The following is a picture of 1. The results of the research model test.

Based on Figure 1. PLS Bootstrapping output, it is obtained that two of the three hypotheses have a t-value above 1.96. This means that two hypotheses are proven, one hypothesis is not proven. The proven hypothesis is that institutional design has a significant effect on the collaborative process, facilitative leadership has an effect on the collaborative process. Meanwhile, 1 (one) hypothesis that is not proven is that the starting condition has no significant effect on the collaborative process. Based on the results of the running, the following is presented in Table 4. Summary of the results of the confirmatory test of research dimensions.

Table 3. Summary of Confirmatory Results of Research Dimensions

No	Hypothesis	Bootstrapping	Algoritme PLS	Result
H_1	*Starting conditions affect collaborative governance*	0,285	-0,021	Declined
H_2	*Facilitative leadership affects collaborative governance*	3,648	0,385	Accepted
H_3	*Institutional design influences collaborative governance*	4,754	0,495	Accepted

DISCUSSION

The general discussion seeks to examine in depth the emergence of problems in the relationship between the variables of collaborative governance theory (Ansell & Gash, 2008, 2018; Forrer, Kee, & Boyer, 2014; Luna-Reyes, Derrick, Langhals, & Nunamaker, 2013; Pardo, Gil-Garcia, & Luna-Reyes, 2010). The test results using SEM with smartPLS show that 2 (two) hypotheses are accepted and one is rejected. The initial conditions of the variables in this study had no effect on the collaborative process. The variables of facilitative leadership and institutional design have a significant and positive effect on the collaborative process variables. That is, to build a collaborative process, facilitative leadership variables and institutional design are needed. It is also significant that there is a problem with the initial condition variable so that it is not in a collaborative process. This is different from previous research which generally found a direct relationship between the initial conditions and the collaborative process. This discussion will explain in depth and systematically about the situation indicated by the three hypotheses.

This discussion will focus on the starting conditions, as the main cause of the ineffectiveness of government collaboration. Experts say that if the initial conditions are not successful, it becomes a source of failure for the next process (Empower. Open Collab. Gov., 2012; Forrer et al., 2014; Kapucu, Yuldashev, & Bakiev, 2009).

(Ansell & Gash, 2008) focuses on four aspects that need to be considered in the initial conditions, namely the imbalance of resources and power among the actors, the level of trust among the actors, the history of previous collaboration experiences or conflicts between actors in previous collaborations, and encouragement. or incentives to be willing to participate and collaborate. A resource imbalance occurs when collaborators do not have the organizational capacity or resources to participate or there is a power/resource gap among collaborators. The second aspect, equality between collaborators will affect the level of internal trust and the level of trust from one collaborator to another externally. The imbalance of power between collaborators will affect the exclusivity of collaborators which then affects the commitment and encouragement to participate. However, even if there is an imbalance, if there is still interdependence between collaborators, there will be guaranteed participation assuming that the achievement of policy objectives, one of which is determined by the role of other actors. This concept is a meaning or dependency analogy. The third aspect of the starting condition is the previous history in the form of cooperation or conflict experiences. When each stakeholder/collaborator has the capacity or experience in past relationships, it can minimize the intensity of conflict in collaborating, and vice versa. The last aspect of the initial conditions is the incentives that must be considered before establishing a collaboration

forum. Incentives that are intentionally needed to encourage participation are given in the form of direct incentives (money or goods) or indirect ones such as prestige, pride, and other psychological aspects as suggested by (Olson, Mancur 2012).

Imbalance of Power and Resources. The imbalance of power and resources was the first finding in the initial conditions before collaboration at the Jabodetabekjur BKSP. This condition is very vulnerable to manipulation and intervention from stronger actors. (Ansell 2007) emphasized the need for (1) a representative organization or forum in the collaboration process, (2) the ability to negotiate, and (3) time and effort to participate in collaboration. The policy for the establishment of BKSP is carried out by a Joint Regulation of the Governor of DKI Jakarta Province, Governor of West Java, Governor of Banten, Regent of Bogor, Mayor of Bogor, Mayor of Depok, Regent of Tangerang, Mayor of Tangerang, Regent of Bekasi, Mayor of Bekasi and Regent of Cianjur Number 3 of 2006, 40 of 2006, 32 of 2006, 1 of 2006, 16 of 2006, 12 of 2006, 35 of 2006, 6 of 2006, 11 of 2006, 12 of 2006, 16 of 2006 concerning the Development Cooperation Agency of DKI Jakarta Province, West Java Province, Province of Banten, Bogor Regency, Bogor City, Depok City, Tangerang Regency, Tangerang City, Bekasi Regency, Bekasi City, and Cianjur Regency. Following the city of South Tangerang in 2010.

The imbalance of power and resources is very evident from the local government programs around DKI which are always "funded" so that DKI is "assisted" by other stakeholders.

The DKI Jakarta Provincial Government is the most powerful with the most resources so that all activities carried out in Jabodetabekjur are controlled by the DKI Provincial Government. Meanwhile, other local governments are the parties that receive the resources to run the DKI program. Since BKSP was formed in 2010, the DKI Provincial Government has provided grants for handling floods, garbage, congestion and other problems that are identical to the Jakarta problem. In 2010 the Provincial Government of DKI provided a grant of Rp. 25 billion to nine local governments that are buffer zones for DKI Jakarta. This grant fund is for development in the fields of health, education, hygiene, synchronization of the Jabodetabekjur area spatial planning, flood control, and waste management. The nine grant recipient areas are Bekasi Regency, Bekasi City, Depok City, Tangerang Regency, Tangerang City, Bogor Regency, Bogor City, and Cianjur Regency, each with IDR 3 billion. Meanwhile, South Tangerang City received a grant of Rp. 1 billion.

In 2011, to develop the Jabodetabekjur area, the DKI Provincial Government disbursed a grant of Rp 45 billion to the regional government (Pemda) which is the partner of the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government. The grant funds are given for the development of partner areas with a composition of 70 percent in the fields of transportation, water resources, spatial planning and the environment and 30 percent in the fields of agriculture, education, health, and the warehousing industry.

In 2012 and 2013, the amount of grant funds to local governments in the Bodetabek area was the same as the amount allocated in 2011, which was Rp 45 billion. Likewise in 2014, it was still budgeted at Rp 45 billion. These funds are given to support the development of the city of Jakarta and the resolution of the problem of the city of Jakarta as the state capital.

Since 2014, the DKI Provincial Government has implemented a rule that every partner city and district government must submit a proposal for submitting partnership funds. In order to be accountable for its use. So far, there is no financial accountability report for the use of partnership funds. With that, it is to begin with, each partner district government and city government submit a proposal for the use of partnership funds to the DKI Provincial Government, including the Bekasi City Government.

In 2015, the Bekasi City Government received a partnership fund of Rp. 98 billion in 2015. The funds were used for the construction of the south side of Jalan Kalimalang in the amount of Rp. 60 billion, the construction of roads and bridges for Bojong Menteng and Jatiasih in the amount of Rp. 8.1 billion, and the completion of the construction of bridges and bridges. widening the road around the Bekasi Timur toll gate by Rp 30 billion.

The request for partnership funds submitted by the Bekasi City Government in 2016 increased quite sharply, reaching more than 100 percent compared to 2015. The DKI Provincial Government

disbursed partnership funds of Rp. 151 billion. The funds were used, among others, for the rehabilitation of Jalan Pangkalan 2 to Jalan Pangkalan 5, rehabilitation of Jalan Pangkalan 5 to TPST Bantargebang, and the procurement of 4 units of spider excavator. The funds are also for the procurement of 1 unit of amphibious excavator, improvement of Cikunir Road, construction of artesian wells, and land acquisition as well as widening of Pasar Rebo Komsen-Jati Asih Road. Bekasi City Government in 2017 received partnership funds of Rp 248 billion, an increase from the previous year. The budget is used for the construction and widening of the Jatiwaringin Raya road and bridge in the amount of Rp. 43 billion, the construction of the Rawapanjang flyover of Rp. 105 billion, and the Cipendawa flyover of Rp. 100 billion.

In 2018, the DKI Provincial Government did not provide partnership funds or grants to Bekasi City, because the DKI Provincial Government did not receive a proposal for partnership funding requests from the Bekasi City Government. Nevertheless, the DKI Provincial Government continues to disburse partnership funds to other local governments, namely Depok, Bogor Regency and Bogor City. The partnership funds were given because the three local governments had submitted proposals. So that their budget can be included in the 2018 DKI Regional Budget. On the official website of the DKI Provincial Government, the DKI Provincial Government has disbursed partnership funds to the Bogor Regency Government in the amount of IDR 13.2 billion. Then, Bogor City Government Rp 10 billion, and Depok City Government Rp 25 billion. Apart from what Premi mentioned, the DKI Provincial Government has budgeted financial assistance for other regions. The website states that there is a budget of Rp 10 billion for the Tangerang City Government and Rp 8 billion for the Cianjur Regency Government.

On this basis, even though there are programs for border areas, the actual expected impact is to fulfill the needs of the people of DKI Jakarta, both those who live in Jakarta and those who work in Jakarta. This is where the power of DKI Jakarta lies in determining the program to be implemented and the budget to be submitted.

Regarding incentives for participation, it can be said that participants' participation will depend largely on their expectations whether the collaboration process will continue to produce something beneficial, especially for the balance between the time and effort they have put in compared to the results they receive. Therefore, the issue that needs to be considered is that the incentives that stakeholders derive from collaboration must always be available. However, ideally, the participation of collaborators should come from voluntary action based on the awareness that public issues must be of common concern. Therefore, whether there are incentives or not, ideally, they should not influence participation for successful collaboration. Therefore, in general it can be said that participant participation still depends on incentives.

In line with (Olson, 2013) which suggests a variety of incentives that can be provided to encourage collective action. Incentives are used to encourage individuals and mobilize groups to follow an action. The types of incentives can be prestige, respect, friendship, or other psychological goals. In addition, there are also selective incentives in the form of sanctions and rewards. Incentives to encourage participation in collaboration, both in the planning and implementation stages of Jabodetabekjur collaboration seem to be in line with the type of incentives suggested (Olson, 2013).

The question arises, what about individuals who do not get incentives, but are still willing to participate in the long term? (Olson, 2013) suggests an indication of motive/interest as a clue. In some cases, the obvious or hidden interests can outweigh the amount of incentives received from participation. Because participation is not only to achieve interests and gain benefits, but sometimes also to avoid losses. Therefore, participation, in some cases, is to save stakeholder interests or avoid harm.

In the context of trust among stakeholders, it can be said that trust is dominated by the relationship between the two parties, namely the DKI Provincial Government and the regional government, while the trust between regional governments and other regional governments is not as strong as trust in the DKI Provincial Government. This is because the DKI Provincial Government is very dominant in controlling power and resources for the sustainability of the collaboration

process and policy setting. While other regional governments can propose activity proposals, the result is DKI that decides.

Mutual trust between collaborators is very important in the collaboration process, referring to the opinion (Vangen & Huxham, 2003) which states that trust is understood as an expectation of the behavior of the other party in the future related to a goal. Trust among collaborators is influenced by a shared understanding of the goals, transparency of information, and consistency of collaborators to the agreed consensus, so that there will be no opportunistic behavior from collaborators (Forrer et al., 2014). Opportunistic behavior ultimately leads to collaboration that seems to work together, but basically, each party just wants to achieve their specific goals (Forrer et al., 2014). Trust can be formed based on expectations for the future and from a historical perspective. Trust is also seen as a mechanism to reduce the opportunistic behavior of the other party.

Mutual trust between collaborators is an absolute factor in collaboration. Distrust from one actor to another will lead to the same distrust from other actors. Building mutual trust can be achieved by, among other things, carefully assessing the historical experiences of the actors' past cooperation. This is important because (Ansell & Gash, 2008) confirms that past history and good experiences in the form of the antagonism (history of conflict) and cooperation can hinder or facilitate ongoing collaboration. (Morton, Gunton, & Day, 2012) states that conflict occurs because of the perception of interests between people who cannot reconcile because of mutual distrust. The opinion (Morton et al., 2012) shows that conflicts in collaboration will always occur because of distrust between actors, and this causes the inability of collaboration actors to achieve goals optimally.

The results show that the historical basis or experience of the parties in collaboration is not taken into account, because the direction of cooperation has been built for a long time according to the presidential instruction in 1976. Regarding trust between collaborators, there is no real conflict. In general, even if there is a conflict, it cannot be understood as a situation of latent distrust, but only arguments and expressions of the different interests of each collaborator in an effort to defend their interests because each party has different perspectives and interests in the collaboration forum. .

The results showed that several examples of conflicts caused by various perspectives among collaborators could be resolved through dialogue in the forum, namely by maximizing the coordination function. For example, related Transjakarta and MRT stops, are difficult to find in several places outside of DKI.

CONCLUSION

Some conclusions that can be conveyed based on the results of the previous presentation are:
1. The results of the analysis show that in general Jabodetabekjur cooperation is not effective.
2. Inter-regional cooperation in the Jabodetabekjur area is not effective because the starting conditions for the parties to cooperate are not balanced in terms of power-resources-knowledge. The very high disparity in power and strength, resources or knowledge makes cooperation to meet the needs of those with stronger resources, in this case the DKI Provincial Government, which at the same time creates dependence on other regions as well as incentives in the form of financial assistance that makes cooperation between regions in Jabodetabekjur all this time running.
3. Hypothetically, facilitative leadership and institutional design affect the collaborative process. This means that to form a collaborative process at BKSP Jabodetabekjur, facilitative leadership and institutional design are needed. These two variables are important to sharpen the strategic plan of the meetings that have been carried out so that they do not become ceremonial meetings. So that actions in each area can be more integrated, not partial-discriminatory

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